The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters Are Uncertain about How the Economy Works

@article{Roemer1994TheSR,
  title={The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters Are Uncertain about How the Economy Works},
  author={John E. Roemer},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={1994},
  volume={88},
  pages={327 - 335}
}
  • J. Roemer
  • Published 1 June 1994
  • Economics
  • American Political Science Review
A continuum of voters, indexed by income, have preferences over economic outcomes. Two political parties each represent the interests of given constituencies of voters: the rich and the poor. Parties/candidates put forth policies—for instance, tax policy, where taxes finance a public good. Voters are uncertain about the theory of the economy, the function that maps policies into economic outcomes. Parties argue, as well, for theories of the economy. Each voter has a prior probability… 

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