• Corpus ID: 169596211

The Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP)

  title={The Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP)},
  author={David Mazi{\`e}res and Stanislas Polu and Nicolas Barry and Jed McCaleb and Giuliano Losa},
SCP is an open Byzantine agreement protocol resistant to Sybil attacks. It allows Internet infrastructure stakeholders to reach agreement on a series of values without unanimous agreement on what constitutes the set of important stakeholders. A big differentiator from other Byzantine agreement protocols is that, in SCP, nodes determine the composition of quorums in a decentralized way: each node selects sets of nodes it considers large or important enough to speak for the whole network, and a… 

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