The Skeptic and the Dogmatist

@article{Pryor2000TheSA,
  title={The Skeptic and the Dogmatist},
  author={James Pryor},
  journal={No{\^u}s},
  year={2000},
  volume={34},
  pages={517-549}
}
Dans la cadre du debat sur la perception du monde exterieur qui oppose le scepticisme et le faillibilisme, l'A. defend une position dogmatique inspiree de l'epistemologie antisceptique de G. E. Moore. Adoptant un modele propositionnel de l'experience, l'A. developpe une approche positive de la justification de la perception. 
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