• Corpus ID: 252531764

The Signaling Role of Leaders in Global Games

  title={The Signaling Role of Leaders in Global Games},
  author={Panagiotis Kyriazis and Edmund Y. Lou},
How important are leaders’ actions in facilitating coordination? In this paper, we investigate their signaling role in a global games framework. A perfectly informed leader and a team of followers face a coordination problem. Despite the endogenous information generated by the leader’s action, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that makes the monotone equilibrium strategy profile uniquely ∆ -rationalizable and hence guarantees equilibrium uniqueness. Moreover, the unique equilibrium… 

Figures from this paper



Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps

This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric

Coordination and delay in global games

Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Players at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process act as if they were entirely uninformed about aggregate play of fellow players in each stage of the coordination process, based on a generalization of the Laplacian property known from static global games.

Peer-Confirming Equilibrium

We can often predict the behavior of those closest to us more accurately than that of complete strangers, yet we routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our

Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the

Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

It is argued that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'.

Rationalization and Incomplete Information

We analyze a family of extensive-form solution procedures for games with incomplete information that do not require the specification of an epistemic type space a la Harsanyi, but can accommodate a

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we

Higher Order Uncertainty and Information: Static and Dynamic Games

Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) have shown that in static games, only very weak predictions are robust to perturbations of higher order beliefs. These predictions are precisely those provided by interim