The Separation of Ownership and Control and Corporate Tax Avoidance

@article{Badertscher2013TheSO,
  title={The Separation of Ownership and Control and Corporate Tax Avoidance},
  author={Brad A. Badertscher and Sharon P. Katz and Sonja Olhoft Rego},
  journal={Journal of Accounting and Economics},
  year={2013},
  volume={56},
  pages={228-250}
}
We examine whether variation in the separation of ownership and control influences the tax practices of private firms with different ownership structures. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that when equity ownership and corporate decision-making are concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these owner-managers will likely be more risk averse and thus less willing to invest in risky projects. Because tax avoidance is a risky activity that can impose significant costs on a firm, we… Expand

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