The Self as a Responding—and Responsible—Artifact

  title={The Self as a Responding—and Responsible—Artifact},
  author={Daniel C. Dennett},
  journal={Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
  • D. Dennett
  • Published 2003
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Abstract: The powerful illusion of a unified, Cartesian self responsible for intentional action is contrasted with the biologically sounder model of competitive processes that yield an only partially coherent agency, and the existence of the illusion of self is explained as an evolved feature of communicating agents, capable of responding to requests and queries about their own decisions and actions. 
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