The Science of Elections

@article{Brams2001TheSO,
  title={The Science of Elections},
  author={Steven J. Brams and Dudley R Herschbach},
  journal={Science},
  year={2001},
  volume={292},
  pages={1449 - 1449}
}
I t comes as a surprise to some that there is a science of elections. Its provenance can be traced back to the Marquis de Condorcet in 18th-century France, Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) in 19th-century England, and Kenneth Arrow in 20th-century America. Since Arrow published his seminal book Social Choice and Individual Values 50 years ago—for which in large part he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1972—there have been thousands of articles and hundreds of books published on… 

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