The Role of Trust and Contractual Safeguards on Cooperation in Non-equity Alliances

  title={The Role of Trust and Contractual Safeguards on Cooperation in Non-equity Alliances},
  author={Steven Lui and Hang‐yue Ngo},
  journal={Journal of Management},
  pages={471 - 485}
  • S. Lui, H. Ngo
  • Published 1 August 2004
  • Business
  • Journal of Management

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