The Role of Termination in Employment Contracts: Theory and Evidence from Film Directors' Careers

@inproceedings{John2003TheRO,
  title={The Role of Termination in Employment Contracts: Theory and Evidence from Film Directors' Careers},
  author={Kose John and Simon Abraham Ravid and Jayanthi Sunder},
  year={2003}
}
Preliminary. Please do not quote or distribute. We would like to thank the Salomon Center at NYU and informal seminar participants at Rutgers University and New York University for comments on a preliminary draft. Abstract Termination in compensation contracts has two potential roles, providing incentives and matching ability of agents to tasks. The extant literature has primarily emphasized the incentive role of termination. In this paper, we examine these roles theoretically and empirically… CONTINUE READING

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