The Role of Rivalry

  title={The Role of Rivalry},
  author={Jose Apesteguia and Frank P. Maier-Rigaud},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={646 - 663}
Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In line with the theoretical literature, the authors argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. Furthermore, they experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public… Expand
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