The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games

@article{Apt2010TheRO,
  title={The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games},
  author={Krzysztof R. Apt and Jonathan A. Zvesper},
  journal={Games},
  year={2010},
  volume={1},
  pages={381-394}
}
  • Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan A. Zvesper
  • Published 2010
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • Games
  • It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify… CONTINUE READING

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