The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

  title={The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding},
  author={David Bourget},
  journal={Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  • D. Bourget
  • Published 1 September 2017
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue… 
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  • D. Bourget
  • Philosophy
    Sensations, Thoughts, Language
  • 2019
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