The Risk Game and the Blame Game *

  title={The Risk Game and the Blame Game *},
  author={Christopher C. Hood},
  journal={Government and Opposition},
  pages={15 - 37}
  • C. Hood
  • Published 1 January 2002
  • Economics
  • Government and Opposition
Economists Say There Is No Such Thing As A Free Lunch. The burgeoning ‘risk industry’ – no doubt set for further expansion after the terrorist attacks on US heartlands in 2001 – says there is no such thing as a risk-free lunch. Anthropologists say there is no such thing as a blame-free risk. And political scientists know blame is central to politics. The growth of the ‘risk industry’, the associated explosion in discussion of safety and hazard issues and the search for better ways of assessing… 

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