The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China

@article{MartinezBravo2022TheRA,
  title={The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China},
  author={Monica Martinez-Bravo and Gerard Padr{\'o} i Miquel and Nancy Qian and Yang Yao},
  journal={American Economic Review},
  year={2022}
}
We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens’ informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We… 

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