The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

  title={The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games},
  author={Working Paper},
  • Working Paper
  • Published 2001
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle – what we term the “delegation principle” – can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria. JEL Classification: D82, L51. 
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Multi - Principaux avec AntiSelection

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