The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings

@inproceedings{Echenique2011TheRP,
  title={The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings},
  author={Federico Echenique and SangMok Lee and Matthew Shum and Mehmet Ali Bumin},
  year={2011}
}
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characterization of the data that are rationalizable as a stable matching when agents’ preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple nonparametric test for stability, in the tradition of revealed preference tests. We also characterize the observed stable matchings when monetary transfers are allowed, and the stable matchings that are best for one side of the market (extremal stable matchings… CONTINUE READING
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