The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee

  title={The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee},
  author={John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={1 - 33}
This study applies the theory of "conditional party government" to the interaction between the Republican party and the Appropriations Committee in the 104th House, seen in the context of developments since the 96th Congress. As expected by the theory, we find that the relatively homogenous preferences of the Republican contingent in the House led them to adopt new institutional arrangements to enhance the powers of their leaders, which in turn were used to advance the party's policy goals… 
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