The Reasons for Wars: An updated survey

  title={The Reasons for Wars: An updated survey},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli},
We thank CEPR for allowing us to organize a workshop on conflict in Switzerland in the months before the deadline for this chapter. We also thank Stergios Skaperdas for comments on an earlier draft. Why do interstate wars occur and recur, especially in cases when the decisions involved are made by careful and rational actors? There are many answers to this question. Given the importance of the question, and the wide range of answers, it is essential to have a perspective on the various sources… 
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