The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism

  title={The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism},
  author={Frederica Russo},
  • F. Russo
  • Published 2 January 2006
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophica
Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. The first developments of quantitative causal analysis in the social sciences are due to Quetelet (1869) and Durkheim (1895 and 1897) in demography and sociology respectively. Significant improvements are due to Blalock (1964) and Duncan (1975). Since then causal analysis has shown noteworthy progress in the formal methods of analysis, e.g., structural equation… 

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