The Rational Design of International Institutions

@article{Koremenos2001TheRD,
  title={The Rational Design of International Institutions},
  author={Barbara Koremenos and Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal},
  journal={International Organization},
  year={2001},
  volume={55},
  pages={761 - 799}
}
Why do international institutions vary so widely in terms of such key institutional features as membership, scope, and flexibility? We argue that international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. In this article we introduce the theoretical framework of the Rational Design project. We identify five important features of institutions—membership, scope, centralization… 
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