## 28 Citations

Query complexity of approximate equilibria in anonymous games

- Computer Science, EconomicsJ. Comput. Syst. Sci.
- 2017

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

- EconomicsSTOC
- 2017

An exp(n) lower bound is proved for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1-ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

Identify the Nash Equilibrium in Static Games with Random Payoffs

- Economics, Computer ScienceICML
- 2017

A multi-armed bandit model is introduced to this problem due to its ability to find the best arm efficiently among random arms and two algorithms for this problem are proposed—LUCB-G based on the confidence bounds and a racing algorithm based on successive action elimination.

Learning Game-Theoretic Equilibria Via Query Protocols

- Computer Science
- 2017

This talk mostly focuses on the paper Fearnley et al. (Learning equilibria of games via payoff queries), which is a relatively recent line of work, which is reviewed here.

Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games

- Economics, Computer ScienceTheory of Computing Systems
- 2018

A randomised algorithm is presented that achieves ε approaching 18$\frac {1}{8}$ for 2-strategy games in a completely uncoupled setting, where each player observes her own payoff to a query, and adjusts her behaviour independently of other players’ payoffs/actions.

Settling the Complexity of Computing Approximate Two-Player Nash Equilibria

- Computer ScienceFOCS
- 2016

We prove that there exists a constant e > 0 such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an e-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (n × n) game requires…

Settling the Complexity of Computing Approximate Two-Player Nash Equilibria

- Computer Science2016 IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)
- 2016

We prove that there exists a constant ε > 0 such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (n × n) game requires…

Informational bounds on equilibria (a survey)

- EconomicsSECO
- 2020

The survey provides a high-level idea of the techniques that are utilized to deduce recently developed lower bounds on Nash equilibria.

Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries

- Economics, Computer ScienceACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
- 2016

It is shown that randomized algorithms require Ω(k2) payoff queries in order to find an ϵ-Nash equilibrium with ϵ < 1/4k, even in zero-one constant-sum games, which rules out query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria.

## References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 36 REFERENCES

Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium

- Economics, Computer ScienceACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
- 2015

A query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles is considered, establishing that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium, any deterministic algorithm must query the black box an exponential number of times.

Query complexity of approximate nash equilibria

- Economics, Computer ScienceSTOC
- 2014

It is shown that even for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n, which means that the Nash equilibrium of a large number of players n and a constant number of actions m is linear in n.

Learning equilibria of games via payoff queries

- EconomicsEC '13
- 2013

This work studies a corresponding computational learning model, and the query complexity of learning equilibria for various classes of games, and has the stronger result that an equilibrium can be identified while only learning a small fraction of the cost values.

Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application

- EconomicsMath. Oper. Res.
- 2017

It is shown that in any n -player, m -action normal-form game, the existence of approximate equilibrium with support-size polylogarithmic in n and m is shown, whereas the previously best-known upper bounds were polynomial in n.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

- Economics
- 1997

We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ‘‘regret-matching.’’ In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to…

Polynomial computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games

- Computer ScienceSECO
- 2011

It is shown that the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm can be modified to compute an exact correlated equilibrium, and can be understood as a derandomization of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden's original separation oracle via the method of conditional expectations.

How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures

- EconomicsGames Econ. Behav.
- 2010

Simple strategies for large zero-sum games with applications to complexity theory

- Mathematics, Computer ScienceSTOC '94
- 1994

An elementary proof that each player of a zero-sum matrix game has a near-optimal mixed strategy that chooses uniformly at random from a multiset of pure strategies of size logarithmic in the number ofpure strategies available to the opponent.

A General Class of Adaptive Strategies

- Economics
- 1999

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average…

Well-Supported vs. Approximate Nash Equilibria: Query Complexity of Large Games

- Computer ScienceITCS
- 2017

It is proved that, for some constant $\epsilon>0$, any randomized oracle algorithm that computes an $\epSilon$-ANE in a binary-action, $n$-player game must make $2^{\Omega(n/\log n)}$ payoff queries.