The Pygmalion Effect : an Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

@inproceedings{Conesa2005ThePE,
  title={The Pygmalion Effect : an Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences},
  author={Juan C. Conesa and Beetsma},
  year={2005}
}
  • Juan C. Conesa, Beetsma
  • Published 2005
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by Kőszegi and Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high… CONTINUE READING

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