The Puzzle of Human Sociality

@article{Boyd2006ThePO,
  title={The Puzzle of Human Sociality},
  author={Robert Boyd},
  journal={Science},
  year={2006},
  volume={314},
  pages={1555 - 1556}
}
  • R. Boyd
  • Published 8 December 2006
  • Biology, Psychology
  • Science
Human cooperation may have evolved as a consequence of genetic relatedness, culture, or language within groups. 
Culture rather than genes provides greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality
TLDR
Comparisons between genetic and cultural differentiation between neighboring groups show how natural selection on large groups is more plausible on cultural rather than genetic variation.
The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups.
Gossip for social control in natural and artificial societies
TLDR
Data is reported from ethnographic studies and agent-based simulations to support the claim that gossip reduces the costs of social control without lowering its efficacy.
Genetic differentiation and the evolution of cooperation in chimpanzees and humans
TLDR
Levels of between-group genetic differentiation in contemporary humans are lower than those used in previous tests, and not higher than those of chimpanzees, which suggests that the identification of other factors that differ between chimpanzees and humans may be needed to provide a compelling explanation of why humans, but not chimpanzees, display the unique features of human cooperation.
Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation
Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of
Reply to comments. Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation: The Interdependence Hypothesis
Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of
Duality Of Stochasticity And Natural Selection Shape The Ecology-driven Pattern Of Social Interactions: The Fall Of Hamilton's Rule
TLDR
From microbes to mammals, cooperation is selected-for in harsh, uncertain and unpredictable environments, and the evolution of cooperation is a bet-hedging (risk spreading) strategy of risk-averse individuals in stochastic environments.
The evolution of cooperative hierarchies through natural selection processes
TLDR
Results of the experiment showed that successful face-to-face transaction strategies varied with environmental risks, showing that even though natural selection is not a moral process, it can produce moral behavior.
The evolution and development of human cooperation
Humans have attained an unparalleled level of sophistication when engaging in collaborative and cooperative activities. Remarkably, the skills and motivation to engage in complex forms of
...
...

References

SHOWING 1-8 OF 8 REFERENCES
Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism
TLDR
Empirical estimates show that genetic differences between early human groups are likely to have been great enough so that lethal intergroup competition could account for the evolution of altruism.
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
TLDR
Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are discussed: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocities, network reciprocation, group selection, and group selection.
Altruism in viscous populations — an inclusive fitness model
  • P. Taylor
  • Biology, Economics
    Evolutionary Ecology
  • 2005
TLDR
It is shown that with an inclusive fitness model, that the same result holds in a patchstructured population, thus opposing the evolution of local altruistic behaviour.
Group Selection by Selective Emigration: The Effects of Migration and Kin Structure
  • A. Rogers
  • Economics
    The American Naturalist
  • 1990
TLDR
The discrete-generation model of selective emigration developed here yields the following conclusions: the fitness benefit of altruism, bp̄, depends on the frequency of altruists, and selective em migration is more likely than kin selection or selective extinction to lead to polymorphic equilibria.
Not by genes alone
  • Keith Jones
  • History
  • 2006
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation
the weakest. I would have liked to seen more direct, critical evaluation of the classical liberal position and its relation to racism, and a stronger, more pointed rejoinder by Levy and Peart to the
The Descent of Man (Project Gutenberg