The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments

  title={The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments},
  author={Roman M. Sheremeta},
  journal={Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal},
Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate personal development. Tournament-based contracts can be very effective in eliciting high effort, often outperforming other compensation contracts, but they can also have negative consequences for both managers and workers. The benefits and disadvantages of workplace tournaments have been identified in theoretical, empirical, and experimental research over the past several decades. Based on these… 
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