The Proper Province of Philosophy

  title={The Proper Province of Philosophy},
  author={Justin Sytsma},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  • J. Sytsma
  • Published 2 April 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology
The practice of conceptual analysis has undergone a revival in recent years. Although the extent of its role in philosophy is controversial, many now accept that conceptual analysis has at least some role to play. Granting this, I consider the relevance of empirical investigation to conceptual analysis. I do so by contrasting an extreme position (anti-empirical conceptual analysis) with a more moderate position (non-empirical conceptual analysis). I argue that anti-empirical conceptual analysis… 
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