The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?

  title={The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?},
  author={Tom McClelland},
Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ‘hard’, which has troubling implications for the science and metaphysics of consciousness. Some regard it as ‘easy’, which ignores the special explanatory difficulties that consciousness offers. Others are unable to decide between these two uncomfortable positions. All three camps assume that the problem of consciousness is either easy or hard. I argue against this disjunction and suggest that the… 
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