The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

@inproceedings{Maskin1990ThePR,
  title={The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values},
  author={Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole},
  year={1990}
}
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