The Price of Quota-based Diversity in Assignment Problems

  title={The Price of Quota-based Diversity in Assignment Problems},
  author={Nawal Benabbou and Mithun Chakraborty and Xuan-Vinh Ho and Jakub T. Sliwinski and Yair Zick},
  journal={ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)},
  pages={1 - 32}
In this article, we introduce and analyze an extension to the matching problem on a weighted bipartite graph (i.e., the assignment problem): Assignment with Type Constraints. Here, the two parts of the graph are each partitioned into subsets, called types and blocks, respectively; we seek a matching with the largest sum of weights under the constraint that there is a pre-specified cap on the number of vertices matched in every type-block pair. Our primary motivation stems from the large-scale… 
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  • Nawal Benabbou
  • Economics
    ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
  • 2021
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