The Price of Probity: Anticorruption and Adverse Selection in the Chinese Bureaucracy

  title={The Price of Probity: Anticorruption and Adverse Selection in the Chinese Bureaucracy},
  author={Junyan Jiang and Zijie Shao and Zhiyuan Zhang},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  pages={41 - 64}
Abstract Fighting corruption is often seen as a crucial step toward building better institutions, but how it affects political selection remains less well understood. This article argues that in systems where corruption functions as an informal incentive for government to attract talent, anticorruption initiatives that curb rent-seeking opportunities may unintentionally weaken both the quality and the representativeness of the bureaucracy. The authors test this argument in China using an… 

The Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Inter-Generational Transmission of Working in Bureaucracy: Evidence from China

There is a clear and persistent inequality of bureaucratic employment between individuals with a bureaucrat parent and those without. Using the recent anti-corruption campaign in China as a

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Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding

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The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China

  • Hanzhang Liu
  • Political Science
    Political Science Research and Methods
  • 2018
Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites’ logic of decision-making due to their

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This paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption. We consider problems of both moral hazard, which arises because taking

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The most effective anticorruption strategies combine prevention and enforcement. Yet the political payoffs are greater for enforcement-centered strategies, even though they often fail to achieve

Controlling Corruption

This book presents a radically new approach to how societies can get corruption under control. Since the late 1990s, the detrimental effects of corruption on human wellbeing have become well