The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta

@article{Hsieh2009ThePO,
  title={The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta},
  author={Chang-tai Hsieh and Daniel Ortega and Edward Miguel and Francisco R. Rodr{\'i}guez},
  journal={Chicago Booth: Initiative on Global Markets Working Paper Series},
  year={2009}
}
In 2004, the Chavez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in… Expand
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References

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The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela&Apos;S Maisanta
In 2004, the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters who had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify… Expand
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