The Presidential Calculus

  title={The Presidential Calculus},
  author={Oct{\'a}vio Amorim Neto},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={415 - 440}
This article proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two policy-making strategies: a strategy based on the use of statutes or a strategy based on executive prerogatives. If the president's preferences and the institutional incentives and economic conditions faced favor a statutory strategy, the president is more likely to appoint a majority cabinet, select more partisan ministers, and… Expand

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