The Poverty of Analysis

  title={The Poverty of Analysis},
  author={David Papineau},
  journal={Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
  • D. Papineau
  • Published 2009
  • Philosophy
  • Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern… Expand
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