• Corpus ID: 14363388

The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy

  title={The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy},
  author={Nathaniel Keohane and Richard L. Revesz and Robert Stavins},
In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, they have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control instruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of… 

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