The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition

@article{Brouard2009ThePO,
  title={The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition},
  author={Sylvain Brouard},
  journal={West European Politics},
  year={2009},
  volume={32},
  pages={384 - 403}
}
  • S. Brouard
  • Published 1 March 2009
  • Political Science
  • West European Politics
This article examines the development of constitutional politics under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it investigates the logics underlying constitutional vetoes. It shows that data for the French case do not support existing theories of veto politics. Therefore, the article develops an electoral theory of veto politics. It emphasises the fact that the incentives generated by electoral competition shape the signalling game between legislative majority, legislative minority and the… 

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