The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan ⇤

  title={The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence : Experimental Evidence from Pakistan ⇤},
  author={Michael Callen and Saad Gulzar and Ali Hasanain and Yasir Khan},
In many developing countries, public sector absence is both common and resistant to reform. One explanation is that politicians preferentially provide public jobs with limited work requirements as patronage. We test this patronage hypothesis in Pakistan using: (i) a randomized evaluation of a novel smartphone absence monitoring technology; (ii) data on election outcomes in the 240 constituencies where the experiment took place; (iii) attendance recorded during unannounced visits; (iv) surveys… CONTINUE READING


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