The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

@article{Besley2000ThePE,
  title={The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India},
  author={Timothy J. Besley and Robin Burgess},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  year={2000}
}
  • T. BesleyR. Burgess
  • Published 1 December 2000
  • Political Science, Economics
  • CEPR Discussion Paper Series
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data… 

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