The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

  title={The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India},
  author={Timothy J. Besley and Robin Burgess},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data… Expand
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  • S. Peltzman
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
  • 1976
In previous literature, George Stigler asserts a law of diminishing returns to group size in politics: Beyond some point it becomes counterproductive to dilute the per capita transfer. Since theExpand