The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock

  title={The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock},
  author={Roger D. Congleton},
  journal={Public Choice},
It is fair to say that few public choice scholars have contributed to so many areas of public choice research as frequently or with as much insight as Gordon Tullock. Professor Tullock's work considers not only political and contractual relationships within a well-established legal order, but also extraordinary political behavior within rent-seeking societies, within firms, at court, within communities at war, among those considering revolution, and among those emerging from or falling into… 

Where are the rent seekers?

In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and

Gordon Tullock as a political scientist

We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science, focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a “natural economist,” but his

The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock

This paper surveys Gordon Tullock’s contributions to constitutional political economy. His first major contribution was his joint project with James Buchanan on liberal constitutional design. The

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the

What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that

Public Choice as a field introduced the framework for a methodical economic analysis of political markets. The output of these markets, of course, is reflected by the role that government plays. That

Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of strategic environmental policymaking with different degrees of product differentiation and different market structures, and examine how

On Some Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock

This chapter suggests that Tullock has made more profound contributions to constitutional political economy and other related fields than he is recognized for, in part, because he himself has failed

Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits

This survey explores the use of models derived from contest theory in conflict theory (i.e. guns Vs butter models). Initially introduced by Hirshleifer during the late?1980s, these models offer a

On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods

This study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods. In order to disentangle the

Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy

The literature suggests that democracy positively affects environmental policy stringency. Using the method of propensity score matching, we find that this result appears to be largely driven by the



On the Trail of Homo Economicus: Essays by Gordon Tullock

This collection of previously unpublished expository writings by Gordon Tullock on themes ranging from game theory, externalities, public choice, rent-seeking, law and economics, and economic

The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy

THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D Tollison states

Gains-From-Trade in Votes

CRITICS of our book, The Calculus of Consent,) have previously disagreed with our relegation of the majority voting rule to the status of one among many alternatives for reaching collective

The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship

I use basic tools of economic theory to construct a simple model of the behavior of dictatorships. Two extreme cases are considered: a “tin-pot” dictatorship, in which the dictator wishes only to

Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice

ConclusionProfessor Tullock has raised a central question in the confrontation between abstract models of PMR and majority rule as practiced in real institutions. We believe the decision making

Problems of Majority Voting

  • G. Tullock
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1959
GORDON TULLOCK University of South Carolina E CONOMISTS have devoted a great deal of thought to problems of governmental policy and, in particular, to the question of proper allocation of resources

Public Decisions as Public Goods

  • G. Tullock
  • Economics, Law
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1971
It is now orthodox in economics to explain the desirability of government by pointing to the existence of public goods and the difficulties which the private market would have in dealing with them.'

Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development

  • M. Olson
  • Economics
    American Political Science Review
  • 1993
Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a

The Rhetoric and Reality of Redistribution

It is customary when giving a presidential address to begin by remarking on how happy you feel. I have an even stronger reason for being happy than most presidents. It will at long last permit me to


If I understand the common view among modern intellectuals, income redistribution is considered to be a rather simple and almost entirely ethical matter. There are, basically, two theories. The first