The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror

  title={The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror},
  author={Thomas D. Mason and Dale Krane},
  journal={International Studies Quarterly},
A central theoretical question in the literature on state-sanctioned terror is whether, and under what conditions, repressive violence deters or stimulates a shift in popular support away from the regime and toward the opposition. By combining a rational choice model of the nonelite response to escalating levels of death squad violence with a structural analysis of the global and domestic conditions under which the escalation of state-sanctioned terror can be expected, we demonstrate… 

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