The Political Economy of Collective Action and Radical Reform: A Proposed Conceptual Framework

  title={The Political Economy of Collective Action and Radical Reform: A Proposed Conceptual Framework},
  author={William Duncan Ferguson},
Radical reform displaces social equilibria. It reorients key institutions and underlying mechanisms of coordination and enforcement. This paper presents a broad framework for analyzing radical reform in terms of a large set of collective-action problems faced by potential reformers. It merges concepts that often appear separately in the literature, including social preferences, power relationships, policy subsystems, institutional stability, types of institutional change, and types of agents… 

Assurance dilemmas of the endangered institutional reforms process in Lesotho

  • Moletsane Monyake
  • Political Science
    Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines
  • 2020
ABSTRACT Lesotho has experienced cyclical episodes of violent conflict over the past 53 years of its independence from Britain. To address this problem, the country has embarked on a process of



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