The Political Cost of War Mobilization in Democracies and Dictatorships

  title={The Political Cost of War Mobilization in Democracies and Dictatorships},
  author={Jeff Carter},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={1768 - 1794}
  • Jeff Carter
  • Published 1 September 2017
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Recent research concludes fighting or losing an interstate war is not costlier for democratic leaders than dictators, which implies most of our institutional explanations for differences in conflict behavior across regime type rest on empirically tenuous assumptions. I argue military mobilization, a fundamental but often overlooked aspect of war, should be costlier for democrats than dictators. Waging interstate war is associated with higher military spending and, often, lower social spending… 

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