The Physical: Empirical, not Metaphysical

  title={The Physical: Empirical, not Metaphysical},
  author={Janice L. Dowell},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • J. Dowell
  • Published 1 October 2006
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Intuitively, physicalism is the thesis that there’s nothing ‘over and above’ the physical. Going beyond this intuitive formulation requires an account of what it is for a property, kind, relation, or object to be a physical one. Here I defend an unfamiliar implementation of the familiar strategy of defining physical properties, etc. as those posited by the complete and ideal physical theory. That implementation ties being a physical theory to being a theory with the hallmarks of scientific… 

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    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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