• DOI:10.2307/2539178
• Corpus ID: 153925234

The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

@article{Sagan1994ThePO,
  title={The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons},
  author={Scott Douglas Sagan},
  journal={International Security},
  year={1994},
  volume={18},
  pages={107 - 66}
}

• S. Sagan
• Published 21 January 1994
• Political Science
• International Security

A n apparent contradiction lies at the center of our understandings about nuclear weapons and deterrence. On the one hand, it is widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the ”long peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The two superpowers avoided war despite a deep geopolitical rivalry, repeated crises, and a prolonged arms race. On the other hand, it is also widely believed that the continuing spread of nuclear weapons will greatly increase the risks of nuclear war. New nuclear powers, with similar characteristics of rivalry, are considered unlikely to maintain stable deterrence. A prominent group of political scientists have pointed to the apparent contradiction between a peaceful nuclear past and a fearful nuclear future and argue that the further spread of nuclear weapons will be a stabilizing factor in international relations. Kenneth Waltz’s 1981 monograph-The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better-presented the first detailed and forceful set of arguments in favor of proliferation.’ Since that time, however, a significant number of rational choice and neorealist political scientists have jumped onto the pro-proliferation bandwagon. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker advocate spreading nuclear weapons into areas where non-nuclear states face nuclear-armed adversaries since ”the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear . . . decreases to zero when all nations are nuclear armed. ‘ ’2 John Mearsheimer believes that ”nuclear weapons are