The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates

@article{Wood2007ThePO,
  title={The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates},
  author={Justin N. Wood and David D. Glynn and Brenda Caldwell Phillips and Marc D. Hauser},
  journal={Science},
  year={2007},
  volume={317},
  pages={1402 - 1405}
}
Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences… Expand
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