The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design

@inproceedings{FilosRatsikas2019ThePF,
  title={The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design},
  author={Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Philip Lazos},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2019}
}
We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give bounds on the space of feasible mechanisms with respect to the above metrics, and observe that two fundamental mechanisms, namely the First-Price (FP) and the Second-Price (SP), lie on the two opposite extrema of this boundary. Furthermore, for the natural class of anonymous task-independent mechanisms, we completely… Expand
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