• Corpus ID: 246035236

# The Parameterized Complexity of Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

@article{Deligkas2022ThePC,
title={The Parameterized Complexity of Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation},
author={Argyrios Deligkas and E. Eiben and Tiger-Lily Goldsmith},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2022},
volume={abs/2201.06904}
}
• Published 18 January 2022
• Computer Science
• ArXiv
Schelling’s model considers k types of agents each of whom needs to select a vertex on an undirected graph, where every agent prefers to neighbor agents of the same type. We are motivated by a recent line of work that studies solutions that are optimal with respect to notions related to the welfare of the agents. We explore the parameterized complexity of computing such solutions. We focus on the well-studied notions of social welfare (WO) and Pareto optimality (PO), alongside the recently…
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