The P–T Probability Framework for Semantic Communication, Falsification, Confirmation, and Bayesian Reasoning

  title={The P–T Probability Framework for Semantic Communication, Falsification, Confirmation, and Bayesian Reasoning},
  author={Chenguang Lu},
  journal={arXiv: Other Statistics},
  • Chenguang Lu
  • Published 2 October 2020
  • Computer Science
  • arXiv: Other Statistics
Many researchers want to unify probability and logic by defining logical probability or probabilistic logic reasonably. This paper tries to unify statistics and logic so that we can use both statistical probability and logical probability at the same time. For this purpose, this paper proposes the P-T probability framework, which is assembled with Shannon's statistical probability framework for communication, Kolmogorov's probability axioms for logical probability, and Zadeh's membership… 

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