The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America

@article{Alemn2005TheOO,
  title={The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America},
  author={Eduardo Alem{\'a}n and George Tsebelis},
  journal={Latin American Research Review},
  year={2005},
  volume={40},
  pages={26 - 3}
}
This paper examines the origins of amendatory vetoes in Latin America and shows why presidents' ability to present a redrafted bill after congressional passage gives them considerable power to affect legislation. The paper begins with a historical account that illustrates the workings of amendatory observations in nineteenth-century Latin America—the passage of the Electoral Law of 1874in Chile. Next, it specifies the degree to which different constitutional procedures allow presidents to… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America
This book provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical, and comparative perspective. Based on a comprehensive analysis of
Constrained Presidential Power in Africa? Legislative Independence and Executive Rule Making in Kenya, 1963–2013
  • K. Opalo
  • Political Science
    British Journal of Political Science
  • 2019
Abstract Do institutions constrain presidential power in Africa? Conventional wisdom holds that personalist rule grants African presidents unchecked powers. Consequently, there is very little
The Institutional Presidency in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis
Introduction The assessment of presidential power has been a central object of analysis in studies on Latin American presidentialism. The initial focus on the personal attributes of the leadership
Constrained Presidential Power in Africa? Legislative Independence and Executive Rule-Making in Kenya, 1963-2013
Do institutions constrain presidential power in Africa? Conventional wisdom holds that personalist rule grants African presidents unchecked powers. Consequently, very little research exists on
Presidents, Policy Compromise, and Legislative Success
Presidents play a central role in legislative activity in Latin America. Previous research highlights that some form of ideological compromise on behalf of the president is vital to sustain
Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries
Nine out of 27 presidents in the former communist world have the power to amend vetoed legislation. These presidential powers in the former Soviet Bloc have not been given adequate attention in the
President and Congress in Paraguay: legislative success in foreign and domestic policy
ABSTRACT The president's ability to legislate is a central element in studies of presidential regimes. A debate persists about the existence of ‘two presidencies’, that is, whether presidential
Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: Effects of Presidential Vetoes on Budget Making
The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both
Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America
The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article
Majority Dominance or Power-Sharing: Control of the Legislative Agenda in the Argentine Congress
The ability to prevent undesired policy changes is a fundamental source of political power. In a series of recent publications, Cox and McCubbins have identified a key mechanism to block policy
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 59 REFERENCES
Building Aspects of Democracy Before Democracy: Electoral Practices in Nineteenth Century Chile
At least once every three years beginning in 1823, unfailingly except for the 1891 presidential contest, Chilean voters were summoned to the polls for presidential, congressional, and/or municipal
Legislative Politics in Latin America: Tables and Figures
Tables and figures Contributors preface and acknowledgements Party names and other acronyms and abbreviations 1. Towards a model of Latin American legislatures Scott Morgenstern Part I.
POLICY MAKING UNDER DIVIDED GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO
Without a majority in the Congress, the president’s party looses the ability to direct policy change. With only one-third of the vote, the president’s party can prevent any initiative from turning
Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-60
This paper presents a typology of different constitutional conceptions, which are designed to help us classify the constitutional conceptions and debates that appeared in Latin America during the
Constitutionalism and rights : the influence of the United States constitution abroad
  • R. Macdonald
  • Political Science
    American Journal of International Law
  • 1992
tions, and Michael Novak, who had been recommended by Kirkpatrick for the post of head of the U.S. delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission. The neo-conservatives subordinated human rights to
Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
Part I. Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy: 1. Basic choices in democratic regime types 2. What is presidentialism? Criticisms and responses 3. The constitutional origin and survival of
Measuring Presidential Power
Despite an increased need to measure presidential power and the increased use of such measurements in empirical studies, there has been little examination of the relative merits of alternative
The art of political manipulation
In twelve entertaining stories from history and current events, a noted political scientist and game theorist shows us how some of our heroes we as well as ordinary folk have manipulated their
Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy
1. Introduction: political institutions and the determinants of public policy Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins Part I. Theory: 2. The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Ideology and valence 2. Accident and force 3. Legislative institutions in the constitution of 1980 4. Roll-call votes and senate committees 5. The Labor committee 6.
...
1
2
3
4
5
...