The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock

  title={The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock},
  author={Henry Hansmann},
  journal={Journal of Law Economics \& Organization},
  • H. Hansmann
  • Published 1 March 1985
  • History, Economics, Business
  • Journal of Law Economics & Organization
Mutuals account for almost half of all life insurance in force and one quarter of all property and liability insurance. There are few other industries in which consumer cooperatives-of which mutuals are an example-account for such a large share of the market. In fact, the annual volume of business done by mutual life insurance companies far outweighs the volume of business done by consumer cooperatives in any other line of business. And it is not just in comparison with other cooperatives that… 

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