The Ordinary Concept of Happiness (and Others Like It)

@article{Phillips2011TheOC,
  title={The Ordinary Concept of Happiness (and Others Like It)},
  author={Jonathan Scott Phillips and Luke William Misenheimer and Joshua Knobe},
  journal={Emotion Review},
  year={2011},
  volume={3},
  pages={320 - 322}
}
The authors provide evidence for a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of emotion concepts. Certain concepts serve simply to pick out a psychological state, whereas others involve a role for moral evaluation. 

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