• Corpus ID: 245353633

The Open Systems View

@inproceedings{Cuffaro2021TheOS,
  title={The Open Systems View},
  author={Michael E. Cuffaro and Stephan Hartmann},
  year={2021}
}
There is a deeply entrenched view in philosophy and physics, the closed systems view, according to which isolated systems are conceived of as fundamental. On this view, when a system is under the influence of its environment this is described in terms of a coupling between it and a separate system which taken together are isolated. We argue against this view, and in favor of the alternative open systems view, for which systems interacting with their environment are conceived of as fundamental… 

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